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Public Trust Concerns
Jordan Farrell *
Abstract
Offshore wind energy development in the Great Lakes presents an immense
opportunity for distributed generation of renewable energy; however, this
potential has thus far remained untapped. One significant barrier to why there
has not yet been such wind energy development in the Great Lakes is the public
trust doctrine. This doctrine generally stands for the principle that a state cannot
convey its submerged lands to a private party. However, there remains much legal
uncertainty with regards to the doctrine. Courts and scholars have struggled to
determine with any certainty the origins and grounding of the doctrine and the
limits it places on states with regards to public trust lands. This uncertainty poses
a barrier to wind energy developers, leaving projects open to legal challenges
and, even if public trust scrutiny is overcome, significant delays.
This article examines the general principles of the public trust doctrine and
analyzes the public trust doctrine in each of the eight Great Lakes states. While
the uncertainties and ambiguity of the doctrine cannot be resolved, based on this
review there are two common exceptions that minimize public trust concerns and
may allow private developments on public trust lands: (1) control or title
remaining with the public; and (2) promotion of the public interest. This article
argues that there is an opportunity to construct an international agreement
between the United States and Canada, and a subsequent interstate compact
between the eight Great Lakes states, to establish a structure for offshore wind
energy transactions in the Great Lakes and to emphasize the public benefit
therein. Such agreements have the potential to mitigate public trust uncertainty
and litigation risk on wind energy developers seeking to harness the wind
potential of the Great Lakes.
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Point, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Michael Barsa for his incredible help and direction
in writing and refining this note, to the Northwestern Journal of International Law and
Business team who supported the publication process, and to my wife, whose support and
patience made it all possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Offshore wind energy development in the Great Lakes region presents
an immense opportunity for distributed generation and energy security, but
the current legal regime relating to submerged lands makes offshore
development in these five lakes bordering the United States and Canada
remarkably difficult. Current law has an anti-regional approach, with stateby-state submerged land ownership and state-by-state public trust doctrine
implications, making private development at a regional level nearly
impossible. Furthermore, the international legal arrangements between the
United States and Canada are at best agnostic to these problems.
Together, these shortcomings create a breeding ground for parties who
oppose project development to initiate litigation and stall or completely
defeat offshore wind deals through a myriad of arguments, including
uncertain regulatory powers and public trust violations. To circumvent the
issues presented by the current legal regime, an international compact
provides an intriguing avenue to establish a uniform approach to offshore
wind development and the development of utility-scale wind farms. While
there has been extensive literature regarding the public trust doctrine and
offshore wind in the Great Lakes, this Note is the first to analyze the potential
for overcoming the current legal barriers through an international and
interstate agreement.
In Part I, I will provide an overview of the overwhelming potential for
offshore wind power in the Great Lakes. In Part II, I will discuss the most
significant barrier to realizing this potential: the various public trust doctrines
in the states bordering the Great Lakes. In Part III, I will describe how an
international and interstate agreement can overcome Public Trust concerns.
In Part IV, I will discuss one foreseeable downside of using an international
and interstate agreement framework to address Public Trust challenges,
namely that the energy generated in one state will enter the grid and
potentially be serving residents outside of that state.
I. BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL OF OFFSHORE WIND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES.
From climate change to air quality to water quality, there are mounting
environmental questions about the current energy system’s reliance on fossil
fuels. 1 There are also questions of national security and energy security for
both the United States and Canada. 2 An economy dependent on fossil fuels
1
E.g., Noah Long & Kevin Steinberger, Renewable Energy Is Key to Fighting Climate
Change, NRDC EXPERT BLOG (July 26, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/noahlong/renewable-energy-key-fighting-climate-change.
2
See generally Charles L. Glaser, How Oil Influences U.S. National Security, 38 INT’L
SECURITY 112, 115 (2013) (discussing how reliance on the oil market generally, either as a
supplier or buyer, can impact economic and national security and the general influences of oil
on national security); ANDREW BEST ET AL., CANADIAN ENERGY SECURITY: WHAT DOES
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bears inherent market volatility as countries simultaneously seek economic
growth and a higher quality of life for their citizens. On top of these
considerations, the COVID-19 pandemic has thrown the world—and the
energy sector—into disarray, heightening the calls for a more secure energy
system in the United States and abroad. 3
The world has known for decades that renewable energy has the
potential to solve many of these problems. Despite this, renewable generation
comprises only a fraction of United States and global energy production. 4
One rising technology for renewable energy generation is offshore wind
farms, and an immense untapped market for such farms lies in the Great
Lakes. These five lakes on the border between the United States and Canada
not only make up the largest freshwater system on Earth5 but have a vast
potential to house the primary energy generating source for this populous
region.
Whether located onshore or offshore, wind energy can be harnessed
through wind turbines. These turbines consist of a set of blades, curved to
create a pressure difference, connected to a rotor. When the wind blows, a
pressure difference is created around the blades causing them to spin and turn
the rotor. The rotor is connected to a generator, so as the rotor turns, the
generator begins to spin, creating an electrical current which is then
transformed and sent to the power grid. 6 While this is a gross
oversimplification of the technology, this general concept allows one to
understand the advantages of wind power generation, especially offshore.
First, this technology is renewable and clean. There is not a finite
amount of wind, nor does harnessing energy from the wind dwindle the
amount of future wind that can be harnessed. This is in direct contrast with
ENERGY SECURITY MEAN FOR CANADA? 10-12 (2010), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/
csis-scrs/documents/publications/Cnd_nrg_Scrt_Rprt-eng.pdf (discussing how renewable
energy plays a key role in Canadian energy security).
3
See Robert Rapier, Will Covid-19 Hasten The Demise of Fossil Fuels?, FORBES (July
12, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2020/07/12/will-covid-19-hastenthe-demise-of-fossil-fuels/#67d7a88b280d; see also Nelson Mojarro, COVID-19 is a GameChanger for Renewable Energy. Here’s Why, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (June 16, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/covid-19-is-a-game-changer-for-renewableenergy/ ; William Cummings, We are on the verge of a massive collapse: Ex-Energy Secretary
Perry says COVID-19 will ravage oil industry, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2020, 7:53 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/01/rick-perry-coronavirus-oilindustry-near-collapse/5102155002/.
4
U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (May 7,
2020), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ (describing United States
energy consumption data); Data and Statistics, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (2020),
https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tables/?country=WORLD&energy=Electricity&
year=2018 (describing global electricity generation statistics for the year 2018).
5
Noah D. Hall & Benjamin C. Houston, Law and Governance of the Great Lakes, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 723 (2014).
6
How Do Wind Turbines Work?, U.S. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/how-do-wind-turbines-work.
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fossil fuels, where there is a finite amount that could possibly be harvested.
The generation of electricity through turbines produces zero carbon
emissions, whereas fossil fuels emit carbon by being burned to turn a
generator. 7 Wind turbines bring with them additional environmental benefits
as well, such as eliminating the need for landscape degradation through
drilling and mining, as well as preserving water resources no longer needed
in traditional fossil fuel generation techniques. 8 Thus, wind energy has a
great advantage with regard to environmental stewardship and climate
change mitigation. The advantages of wind energy are not solely
environmental. All renewable energy generating facilities, including wind,
serve economic, national security, and energy security goals as well. 9
Onshore wind development is one of the most prevalent renewable
energy sources and one of the fastest growing energy generation
mechanisms. 10 However, there are a number of valid criticisms of onshore
wind development. Primarily, the current transmission grid is ill-equipped to
ensure easy connection of new wind farms to the electrical grid. The current
transmission grid in the United States focuses on high-capacity fossil fuel
plants located relatively close to major consumption points. 11 Inconsistent
with this current system, the highest potential production for onshore wind
farms is in the Great Plains region of the United States, far away from many
major consumption points. 12 These geographic considerations present
7
Wind Power Facts and Statistics, AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION,
https://www.awea.org/wind-101/benefits-of-wind/environmental-benefits.
8
Id.
9
For a full description of these benefits, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY & U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY 19-22 (2016),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/09/f33/National-Offshore-Wind-Strategyreport-09082016.pdf; see also AMERICAN COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE ROLE OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN NATIONAL SECURITY 1-9 (2018), https://acore.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/ACORE_Issue-Brief_-The-Role-of-Renewable-Energy-in-NationalSecurity.pdf (discussing how nations rely on foreign sources for fossil fuel resources,
especially coal and oil, and how renewable energy can serve national security and energy
security goals by lowering this reliance).
10 Data and Statistics, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (2017), https://www.
iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tables/?country=WORLD&year=2017&energy=Renewables
%20%26%20waste (showing global energy statistics in 2017 finding that wind power is the
second greatest global renewable energy generating technology only behind hydropower);
Wind, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (2020), https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/
wind (comparing onshore global wind data to offshore wind data); Wind Vision, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/maps/map-projected-growth-windindustry-now-until-2050 (showing a map of the projected growth of wind energy industry in
the United States).
11 See Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/barriers-renewable-energy-technologies.
12 Wind Prospector, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, https://maps.
nrel.gov/wind-prospector/?aL=MlB4Hk%255Bv%255D%3Dt%26VMGtY3%255Bv%255D
%3Dt%26VMGtY3%255Bd%255D%3D1&bL=clight&cE=0&lR=0&mC=19.8080541
2808859%2C-114.78515624999999&zL=3. Note the prevalence of high-class wind potential
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another problem. Even when the transmission grid reaches these production
facilities, efficiency in generation will be dampened due to the long distances
the power must travel to reach the point of consumption.13 While modern
transformer and power line technology have sought to minimize these losses,
the comparative location continues to add cost to production. 14 The second
primary argument against wind power is that it is too intermittent to provide
a reliable energy resource. 15 This criticism has largely been disproven, and
the continuing advancement of transmission efficiency and battery storage
technology is making intermittency less of a barrier. 16 Nonetheless, this
concern continues to loom large in the minds of those who resist wind energy
development. 17
The reason the Great Lakes and offshore wind energy, in general, have
such a high magnitude for energy generation is because offshore wind
turbines maximize the advantages of wind energy while minimizing the
disadvantages of onshore wind farms. Offshore wind farms maximize energy
generation potential through mechanics that are not possible onshore. Wind
turbines can be built taller with larger rotors, capturing significantly more
energy than onshore wind turbines. 18 Larger towers and greater generation
potential lead to reduced cost and greater profit for the developers.19
Additionally, offshore wind generation has the ability to overcome the
in the Great Plains region, lack of onshore potential in the Great Lakes states, and the highclass potential of the Great Lakes.
13 See How much electricity is lost in electricity transmission and distribution in the
United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (May 14, 2021),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=105&t=3.
14 Id. (describing power loss due to transmission).
15 Jinfu Liu et al., Overview of wind power intermittency: Impacts, measurements, and
mitigation solutions, 204 APPLIED ENERGY 47 (2017).
16 Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, supra note 11.
17 Id.
18 See WALTER MUSIAL ET AL., 2018 OFFSHORE WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 31
(U.S. Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 2019), https://www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2019/09/f66/2018%20Offshore%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market
%20Report.pdf; see also, Haliade-X offshore wind turbine, GE RENEWABLE ENERGY,
https://www.ge.com/renewableenergy/wind-energy/offshore-wind/haliade-x-offshoreturbine#:~:text=Introducing%20the%20Haliade%2DX%2012,63%25)%2C%20and%20
digital%20capabilities; see also David Roberts, These huge new wind turbines are a marvel.
They’re also the future, VOX (May 20, 2019 12:36 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2018/3/8/17084158/wind-turbine-power-energy-blades. At the time of this note,
General Electric has begun marketing the world’s largest offshore wind turbine, which stands
260 meters tall and has rotors that are 220 meters. These turbines are nearly twice the size of
the average onshore wind turbine in the United States and have a nameplate capacity of
12MW, which is nearly four times the average nameplate capacity of an onshore wind turbine
in the United States today. Even without going to the extreme, the average offshore wind
turbine averages nearly double the average onshore wind turbine nameplate capacity at 6MW
compared to 3MW.
19 NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 30, https://www.energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2016/09/f33/National-Offshore-Wind-Strategy-report-09082016.pdf.
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transmission issues previously discussed. First, the distributed nature of the
generation ensures that production occurs near consumption. This minimizes
total distance transmitted and grid congestion, which would typically lead to
inefficiencies in transmission. 20 Especially in the Great Lakes, major
metropolitan areas such as Toronto, Chicago, Mississauga, Milwaukee, and
Cleveland, all currently without great potential to develop renewables on
land, could have distributed wind production within close proximity. 21 The
U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that the Great Lakes have a gross
offshore wind potential of 519 GW which equates to a technical potential of
136 GW. 22
Thus, the question is: what is preventing this region from discovering
and utilizing this untapped potential at its doorstep? 23 One answer is a
piecemeal legal regime and regulatory environment that regulates submerged
land development under one of the most ambiguous and murky legal
doctrines in American jurisprudence, making the development of private
energy generating facilities extremely difficult if not impossible to navigate.
II. THE CURRENT SUBMERGED LANDS LEGAL REGIME LEAVES
STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES TO GOVERN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBMERGED LANDS, WHICH IS A BARRIER
TO OFFSHORE WIND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES.
One of the primary roadblocks to the development of offshore wind in
the Great Lakes is the current legal regime which leaves individual state
public trust doctrines to govern the development of submerged lands and
waterways. 24 Generally, the public trust doctrine sets forth that a state holds
Id. at 22.
See Ms Aggie, The Biggest Cities on the Great Lakes, WORLD ATLAS (Nov. 28, 2019),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-biggest-cities-on-the-great-lakes.html. For a full
discussion on the market for offshore wind farms in the United States see NATIONAL OFFSHORE
WIND STRATEGY, supra note 9; MUSIAL, supra note 18.
22 NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 8, 13. The report further notes
that this potential is significantly lower due to current technological constraints. Because of
the Great Lakes’ propensity to freeze and the inability of current floating foundations to resist
surface ice floes, the study only considered areas of the Great Lakes with a water depth of 60
meters or less.
23 It is interesting to consider that the Department of Energy predicts offshore wind energy
generation will become part of the total wind capacity in the Great Lakes states by 2030. Wind
Vision, supra note 10.
24 The five lakes which make up the Great Lakes are governed by highly complex
governance structure. The lakes are shared by two nations, eight states, two provinces,
thousands of local governments, and numerous indigenous tribes. The primary international
agreement governing the relations between the United States and Canada with regards to the
Great Lakes is the Boundary Waters Treaty (Treaty). While the Treaty establishes obligations
for navigability, commerce, and pollution, it gives each nation the power to carry on
“governmental works in boundary waters…wholly on its own side of the line.” The Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat 2448, https://ijc.org/
sites/default/files/2018-07/Boundary Water-ENGFR.pdf. No international treaty between the
20
21

123

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:117 (2021)

in trust for the benefit of the public certain lands, and those benefits cannot
be abridged. 25 Those lands subject to the public trust doctrine include surface
waters and submerged lands. 26 Considering offshore wind turbines require
structures secured to or tethered to the submerged lands underneath the Great
Lakes, they are unquestionably subject to the public trust doctrine.
There is an overwhelming amount of scholarship and case law
discussing the public trust doctrine, its origins, and its implications. 27 I will
not attempt to replicate this work already done. I will focus my discussion on
the general principles of the public trust doctrine as it relates to offshore wind
development, the major points of murkiness in the doctrine, the uncertainty
of the state-by-state doctrinal approach, and how this regime serves as a
barrier to offshore wind development.
A. Public Trust Doctrine Generally
There is little overall certainty with regards to the public trust doctrine.
It is clear that the doctrine is a fundamental principle in United States law
and an outgrowth of ancient Roman and English principles protecting lands
in trust for the public. 28 The law of the public trust doctrine has developed
over time through common law jurisprudence. The seminal case regarding
the limits placed on states by the public trust doctrine is Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. Illinois (hereinafter Illinois Central). 29 While there is
much disagreement as to the holding in Illinois Central and the legal
grounding for the public trust doctrine, there are general principles found in
the case which can provide a foundation for understanding the public trust
countries has covered the topic of submerged landholding. United States domestic law clearly
states submerged lands are governed by the individual states. This principle has been
statutorily codified in the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1986), providing title
and ownership of submerged lands (lands beneath navigable waters) to states. However, this
statute is an outgrowth of the Equal Footing Doctrine, the finding by the Supreme Court that
the original states retained rights to govern submerged lands beneath their navigable waters,
and therefore, all future states must constitutionally retain these rights as well. Pollard’s Lessee
v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410-11 (1842).
25 See Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 910 (2007),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1324&context=mjlr.
26 Id.
27 Frey, supra note 25, at 910 n.17 (noting the immense amount of literature on the public
trust doctrine); Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2012), https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/45/3/Topic/453_Klass.pdf.
28 E.g., Frey, supra note 25, at 918.
29 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) [hereinafter Illinois
Central]. One of the foundational scholarly articles of the public trust doctrine describes
Illinois Central as “the Lodestar in American Public Trust Law. Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471, 489 (1970), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4782&context
=mlr.
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doctrine.
In Illinois Central, the Court set forth in broad terms that a state’s
holding of submerged lands is “a title held in trust for the people of the state,
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.”30 Such language suggests that the public trust
doctrine is fundamentally an anti-private development principle that seeks to
preserve the quality and use of these natural resources for future
generations. 31 Another way of putting this is that the public trust doctrine
places a fiduciary obligation on states to restrict uses of lands that are held in
public trust to protect them from impairment of these traditional public
uses. 32
The Court in Illinois Central goes on to delineate the restrictions on
states imposed by the public trust doctrine. Primarily, the Court holds that a
state cannot convey public trust property for private party benefit. Again, the
Court uses very broad language:
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private
parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration
of government and the preservation of the peace. 33

However, the Court places a caveat on this restriction in saying,

Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
See also Frey, supra note 25, at 908 (“The modern doctrine of public trust in waterways
compels the Great Lakes states, as trustees of the beds of the Great Lakes, their waters, and
their living contents, to ensure a sustainable future for the lakes and to preserve their traditional
public uses and natural character.” (citing Illinois Central at 452)). But see Joseph D. Kearney
& Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 924-25 (2004),
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=facpub
(concluding that Justice Fields’ use of the public trust doctrine was not an anti-development
doctrine, but rather the only tool that could be used to “preserve access to the lake for
commercial vessels at competitive prices”).
32 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property
in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of
parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace.”). For an in-depth analysis of the doctrine set forth in Illinois Central, see Kearney,
supra note 31. For a discussion of the adoption and general principles of the public trust
doctrine, see Sax, supra note 29, at 475; Michael Julius Motta, The Walking Dead or Weekend
at Bernie’s? How the Public Trust Doctrine Threatens Alternative Energy Development, 5
WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 329 (2014).
33 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
30
31
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It is grants of parcels under navigable waters that . . . do not
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, that are . . . [a] valid exercise of legislative power
consistently with the trust of the public upon which such lands are
held by the state. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust
can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interest of the public therein. 34

Thus, the Court seems to place two major exceptions on the broad public
trust doctrine principles stated. If the state does not wholly abdicate the use
and control of lands to private parties, or if the parcel is to be used in
promoting a public interest, the actions of the state will not be in violation of
the public trust doctrine. The Court ultimately held that Illinois’ grant of
public trust lands to the Railroad was “necessarily revocable” as the state
could not wholly abdicate their public trust responsibilities, and therefore
“the trust by which the property was held by the state can be resumed at any
time.” 35
If read in a vacuum, Illinois Central seemingly sets forth public trust
principles. However, the ambiguity in the decision becomes quite clear when
looking to apply the doctrine more broadly. One major question following
Illinois Central and the other early public trust doctrine cases is what law the
public trust doctrine is grounded in—a salient question because the Court did
not cite any authority for the broad principles outlined above. Scholars have
separately concluded that the public trust doctrine is a matter of federal
constitutional law, 36 federal law 37, and state law. 38 While there must be some
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
36 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989),
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1970&context=articles; James
R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust
Doctrines, 32 LAND WATER L. REV. 1 (1997), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/
217081453.pdf.
37 Kearney, supra note 31, at 928 n.577.
38 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (1983) [hereinafter
Mono Lake Case] (holding the state’s public trust doctrine may be used to challenge allocation
of waters of the Mono Basin, expanding the traditional definition of the public trust doctrine);
see also Kacy Manahan, Comment, The Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, 49 ENVTL. L.
263 (2019), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/27949-49-1manahanpdf (arguing that state
constitutional provisions are the proper grounding for the public trust doctrine). See also Eric
Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713,
717 n.22 (1996) (citing Wilkinson, supra note 36). If one sentence can encompass the
confusion of the public trust doctrine, I feel it is this one. In Wilkinson’s article, he argues that
the public trust doctrine is grounded in constitutional law as an outgrowth of the equal footing
doctrine. Yet, he starts the article by stating “the public trust doctrine announced in [Illinois
Central] . . . and the state-law based trust doctrines total 51 public trust doctrines.” While
attempting to find an answer to the question, the haziness once again prevails. See also LOU
ELLIOTT, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND OFFSHORE WIND IN THE GREAT LAKES (2010),
34
35
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federal component to the public trust doctrine, this may only extend to an
analysis of what lands are subject to the doctrine.39 This is because the lands
subject to the doctrine are the lands that a state gains by virtue of state
sovereignty under the equal footing doctrine. 40 Indeed, many cases
adjudicating public trust disputes look to federal law in determining the
extent of state public trust lands. 41 On the other hand, other cases have held
that the extent of the lands held in public trust is determined by states. 42
It seems equally likely that the public trust doctrine is grounded at least
in part in state law. Because of the doctrinal confusion, it is said that there
are 51 public trust doctrines, one for each state and then the federal
component. 43 Most states have an established public trust doctrine through
judicial decisions, state constitutions, or common law principles, with many
states developing their doctrine with an eye towards the principles set forth
in Illinois Central and other early public trust doctrine cases. 44 However,
these state doctrines still vary widely in their definitions, scope, and
exceptions. 45 In addition, courts have found that those states do not have an
ultimate right in defining the scope of the public trust doctrine, finding the
principles of Illinois Central as a barrier to complete state control. 46 Thus,
https://www.glc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2010-ubls-public-trust-doctrine.pdf (citing
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006)).
39 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 434 (citing Pollard’s Lessee 44 U.S. at 212 (establishing
that submerged lands belong to the states through the equal footing doctrine and therefore are
subject to the public trust and discussing public trust in terms of commerce and navigation as
federal concerns); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) (holding that the extent of
public trust lands turns on navigability, which is a federal question).
40 Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 228-29; Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410-11
(1842).
41 Defs. of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 728, 738-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Illinois
Central in determining that the public trust doctrine created duties on Arizona in regard to
submerged lands and holding an essential outright disclaimer to “watercourse bedlands”
violates the public trust doctrine); see also United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931)
(holding that the extent of public trust lands turns on navigability, which is a federal question).
42 E.g., Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1182 (Ind. 2018)
(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)); Lee v. Williams, 711
So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
43 Wilkinson, supra note 36, at 425.
44 See BLUMM ET AL., LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH. LEGAL STUDIES, THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN FORTY-FIVE STATES (Michael C. Blumm eds., 2014), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235329.
45 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENV’T L. REV.
1 (2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228138146_A_Comparative_Guide_to_
the_Eastern_Public_Trust_Doctrine_Classifications_of_States_Property_Rights_and_State_
Summaries; Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/24114989?seq=1.
46 E.g., Mono Lake Case at 723-24 (“[T]he Attorney General of California . . . argues for

127

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:117 (2021)

the doctrine cannot be entirely a creature of state law either. Other cases
openly acknowledge the uncertainty of the extent of the public trust
doctrine. 47
The question then becomes: if there is uncertainty as to what legal
grounding the doctrine has, to what degree can individual states define their
public trust doctrines differently? It seems clear enough that states cannot
completely abdicate the public trust responsibilities, but what are those
responsibilities exactly? Are they defined by Illinois Central or by state
statute or something else? As states have passed legislation to define the
public trust doctrine, the questions become whether these definitions are
binding on the individual states, what level of deference will be given to such
statutes, and whether courts will impose separate public trust doctrine
principles if they find that the doctrine is not grounded in state law.
These questions compound when looking at explanations by courts in
public trust doctrine cases. The opinions by various courts seemingly cannot
be reconciled to find an answer to these many questions. The plain language
of Illinois Central sets an outer limit that states may not abdicate their
responsibilities to protect this public trust land. However, commentators and
courts have argued and held that states have significant flexibility in defining
the public trust doctrine and complying with such requirements. Defenders
of Wildlife v. Hull 48 from Arizona discusses the need for the legislature to
conduct a “particularized assessment,” and if such an assessment is not done,
the transfer of public trust lands may be forfeited. Thus, questions arise
concerning the ability of a state to dictate the public trust by conducting such
a particularized assessment. In Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 49 the court upheld a state code provision which
set forth powers of the Department of Lands to “regulate and control the use
or disposition of lands in the beds of navigable lakes, rivers and streams . . .
so as to provide for their commercial, navigational, recreational or other
public use. . . .” 50 While the court noted that public lands cannot be alienated
legislatively and that the public trust doctrine sets the outer boundary for
government action, this holding still affirmed a transfer of public trust lands
by the administrative agency and seemingly gave significant flexibility to
legislative and administrative determinations in such a decision. 51 The court
emphasized that the process set forth was constitutional under the state
a broad concept of trust uses. . . . encompass[ing] all public uses. We know of no authority
which supports this view. . . . [The public trust doctrine] is an affirmation of the duty of the
state to protect the people’s common heritage of [resources]. . . .”).
47 Defs. of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 728 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“Although the extent
of the public trust to be found in the bedlands of Arizona’s waterways is presently
undefined.”).
48 Id.
49 Kootenai Env’t All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
50 Id. at 1094.
51 Id. at 1095.
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constitution and that abiding by this process was key in affirming the decision
of the Department of Lands. 52 Thus, this decision shows in Idaho that the
state has to set processes and standards for the abdication of public trust
lands, even though the duties themselves cannot be abdicated.
Scholars of the public trust doctrine have additionally argued that
judicial deference to legislative and executive determinations that grants are
within the public trust is proper. 53 This confusion culminates with the express
language of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, another paramount public
trust doctrine case. 54 In Phillips Petroleum, the Court stated, “[i]t has been
long established that the individual States have the authority to define the
limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such
lands as they see fit.” 55 This quote suggests that States have the power to
define both scope and standard of the public trust; however, by express terms,
this language runs directly counter to the principles set out in Illinois Central.
There, the court expressly prohibited states from exercising power to
recognize private rights as they saw fit. 56 Despite this uncertainty, courts
across the country have used this language from Phillips Petroleum in
adjudicating public trust disputes. For example, in Lee v. Williams, a Florida
Court states, “[w]hat Phillips Petroleum makes clear, however . . . is that the
public trust doctrine is a creature of the common law, the extent of which and
alterations to which are subject to judicial determination, at least where there
is no contrary constitutional or legislative directive” (emphasis added). 57
Therefore, neither the scholarship nor the caselaw provides answers to the
doctrinal confusion about the depth and breadth of state power in setting
public trust doctrine principles.
B. Public Trust Doctrine of the Eight States Surrounding the Great Lakes
Recognizing there is irreconcilable confusion on the foundations of the
public trust doctrine, it becomes necessary when discussing development of
public trust lands in the Great Lakes to understand from a high level the
52

Id.
See Motta, supra note 32, at 331 n.10; see also ELLIOTT, supra note 38.
54 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
55 Id. at 475.
56 See also Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J.
1972) (recognizing that prior court decisions in the jurisdiction give an unlimited power in the
legislature to convey such trust lands to private persons but noting that this appears to be in
direct conflict with Illinois Central).
57 Lee v. Williams, 711 So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also Donnell v.
United States, 834 F. Supp. 19, 26 (D. Me. 1993). (“Under the public trust doctrine, the United
States Supreme Court has established that ‘the individual states have the authority to define
the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they
see fit.’ Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988). Maine may properly
give property rights to land submerged under private structures in the water to the private
structure owner; however, these state property rights remain subject to the federal
government’s control for purposes of navigation and commerce.”).
53
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public trust doctrine of each Great Lakes state. While each of these states
finds the core of its public trust doctrine in Illinois Central, the subtle
variations in each state further exemplify the existing difficulty of navigating
the public trust doctrine in offshore wind development. Furthermore, in each
of the eight Great Lakes states, courts have thwarted projects and
development by finding violations of the public trust doctrine, often in
directly contradictory terms. Thus, part of the difficulty comes in predicting
the uncertain application of the public trust doctrine in these states.58
1. Illinois
While questions remain about the broader applicability of Illinois
Central and what it stands for, it is clear that Illinois looks to Illinois Central
to set the state’s public trust doctrine and to determine conveyances of public
trust property. 59 As a foundation, the court has stated, “[i]t can be seen that
the State holds title to submerged land . . . in trust for the people, and that in
general the governmental powers over these lands will not be relinquished.” 60
However, the court has also recognized exceptions in allowing
conveyances of public lands to pass muster in public trust analysis. In People
v. Kirk, for example, the court found that building a road over reclaimed
public trust lands was not a violation of the public trust doctrine as
governmental powers continued to be exercised over the lands, the legislature
could continue to exercise control, and that conveyance did not interfere with
navigation or fishing as it had existed prior. 61 Furthermore, another Illinois
precedent has relied on Illinois Central in finding a conveyance of land for
public benefit to overcome public trust concerns. In Friends of Parks v.
Chicago Park District, the court found that a grant of public trust lands for
further development of Soldier Field, held by a private party, did not violate
the public trust doctrine because of the public benefit of athletics, arts,
culture, and use of the lakefront as a whole. 62 The court further supports this
conclusion by citing a statement that seems to directly contradict the holding
of Illinois Central itself: “[t]he resolution of [the conflict between those who
58 For this discussion, the primary focus is on any variability of the public trust doctrine’s
general application of these eight states as it pertains to the submerged lands of the Great
Lakes. For a more robust analysis of the variability in other public trust doctrine considerations
between the states, for example what lands the public trust doctrine applies to, see Kenneth K.
Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2010),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/216928525.pdf; Frey & Mutz, supra note 25. For a more
detailed discussion of some of the Great Lakes states’ respective public trust doctrines, see
BLUMM, supra note 44.
59 Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 312, 326 (Ill. 2003) (“Illinois
Central involved the conveyance of public trust property to a private party. The doctrine was
applied by this court to a similar transfer in People ex. rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d
773 (1976).”).
60 People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ill. 1976).
61 People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 151 (1896).
62 Friends of Parks, 786 N.E.2d at 170.

130

Public Trust and Offshore Wind Development in the Great Lakes
42:117 (2021)

want to preserve and those who want to develop in good faith for the public
good lands considered inviolate to change] is for the legislature and not the
courts.” 63
Despite these statements, Illinois has often found conveyances of public
trust lands to be in violation of the public trust doctrine. Notwithstanding the
recent cases exercising these exceptions, Illinois courts have historically
voided almost all transactions in which public trust lands have been conveyed
to private interests. 64 For example, in People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park
Dist. the court held that the conveyance of submerged lands of Lake
Michigan to the United States Steel Corporation was in violation of the public
trust. 65 In finding a violation, the court noted that public benefit cannot
simply be incidental to the grant, such as jobs or economic growth, but rather
that the purpose of the grant, even if to private interests, is for a public
benefit. 66 The court distinguishes from People v. Kirk 67 in that even though
that conveyance was to a private party, the purpose of the grant itself to
expand Lake Shore Drive was primarily a public interest and could overcome
public trust scrutiny. The court further found in Lake Michigan Federation
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers a legislative conveyance to Loyola to be a
violation of the doctrine because, even though there would be public
lakefront access and the conveyance was for an educational institution, the
grant was for the benefit of a private university and thus in violation of the
trust. 68
These discussions illustrate the difficulty of development due to a lack
of certainty. While certain cases, such as People v. Kirk, have shown the
opportunity to overcome public trust scrutiny, the doctrine has been used to
thwart development time and time again. Even in cases in which the private
development arguably was providing benefit, the conveyance to private
benefit halted any development. The uncertainty of the doctrine and prior use
of the doctrine to hold transfers of Great Lakes and other public trust lands
63 Id. (quoting Paepcke v. Public Building Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 21 (Ill. 1970)
(holding use of park property for school purposes was not in violation of the public trust
doctrine)).
64 People ex rel. Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 779-81 (citing a litany of cases in which Illinois
courts, and courts in general, have found conveyance of public trust lands to private interests
to be in violation of the public trust doctrine and noting that the only conveyance to private
purpose that withstood public trust consideration was Lake Shore Drive). See also Kilbert,
supra note 58, at 49 (“Tracing cases involving legislative grants of submerged lands under
Lake Michigan since Illinois Central, the court found only one instance where a legislative
grant of submerged land under Lake Michigan did not violate the public trust: where the sale
of a strip of shore was upheld in order to facilitate the extension of Lake Shore Drive over the
reclaimed land.”).
65 People ex rel. Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 781.
66 Id.
67 People v. Kirk (Lakeshore Drive Case), 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896).
68 Lake Michigan Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F. Supp. 441, 447 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
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unconstitutional, going all the way back to Illinois Central, stands as a barrier
to potential offshore wind project developers.
2. Indiana
Like in Illinois, the Indiana Supreme Court recently interpreted the
public trust doctrine in Gunderson v. State of Indiana by referencing Illinois
Central and held the doctrine to be a common law fiduciary duty of the state
to hold certain lands in trust for the public. 69 The court also discusses how
the public trust doctrine is also at least in part codified in the Indiana Code’s
lake preservation statute. 70 In analyzing the state’s Lake Preservation Act,71
the court found that there was no intent by the legislature to abdicate the
state’s rights to this land by excluding Lake Michigan from the public
protections provided by the act. 72 In doing so, the court proffers Indiana’s
general public trust principle that “[e]ven if the legislature had intended to
extinguish public trust rights in the shores of Lake Michigan, it lacked the
authority to fully abdicate its fiduciary responsibility over these lands [except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein]”
(emphasis added). 73 As for the role of the legislature in public trust analysis,
the court notes,
[B]eyond [the protected uses of navigation, commerce, or fishing],
separation of powers compels us to exercise judicial restraint . . .
[especially] where the legislature has codified, in part, our State’s
public trust doctrine. . . Thus, we conclude that any enlargement of
public rights on the beaches of Lake Michigan beyond those
recognized today is better left to the more representative lawmaking
procedures of the other branches of government. 74

While this case was in part a decision on the Department of Natural
Resources ability to define the line to which the public trust doctrine would
apply, it exemplifies the beliefs of the Indiana court that (1) the public trust
doctrine is a common law principle defined by Illinois Central; and (2) the
legislature is in the position to make determinations on the expansion of the
public trust doctrine, especially considering the codification of the public
trust doctrine in Indiana statue. Indiana Statute provides that the citizens of
Indiana have a vested right in the preservation and protection of Lake
Gunderson v. Indiana, 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1183 (Ind. 2018).
Id. at 1188 (“[T]he legislature has codified, in part, our State’s public trust doctrine.
See I.C. §§ 14-26-2-1 to -25.”).
71 IND. CODE § 14-26-2 (2020).
72 Gunderson, 90 N.E.3d at 1183.
73 Id. (quoting Illinois Central (“[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein.”)).
74 Id. at 1187.
69
70
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Michigan. 75 Furthermore, this provision shows that Indiana recognizes the
Illinois Central exception that states may abdicate public trust lands if the
purpose is to promote a public interest. However, no Indiana case has
adjudicated the standard or limits of this exception. Accordingly, the Indiana
public trust doctrine remains uncertain in application. It leaves questions
open about the extent of the exceptions as well as the balance between the
state’s control over the doctrine and that of other sources such as federal law
and Illinois Central. These uncertainties, paired with the lack of public trust
jurisprudence in Indiana, pose a risk to public trust concerns for potential
offshore wind developers under this current legal regime.
3. Michigan
Michigan also recognizes the public trust doctrine as a common law
principle applicable to the Great Lakes and other public trust bodies of
water. 76 Michigan adopted a general rule in Nedtweg v. Wallace, citing to the
principles of Illinois Central in saying, “[t]he rights of the public . . . [deny]
the power [of the state], by grant or otherwise, to abdicate the trust by placing
use and control in private hands to the curtailment or exclusion of public
use.” 77 This rule has been succinctly stated by the courts to be, “the state, as
sovereign, has an obligation to protect and preserve the waters of the Great
Lakes and the lands beneath them for the public.” 78
Again, it is unclear what these broad statements mean in any particular
case. As a general rule, “Michigan has an undoubted right to make use of its
proprietary ownership of the land in question, [subject only to the paramount
right of] the public [to] enjoy the benefit of the trust.” 79 This statement is
further made in the context of determining whether Michigan must at all
times “remain the proprietor of, as well as the sovereign over, the soil
underlying navigable waters.” 80 What is somewhat clear is that there are
qualifications on the public trust doctrine that serves as a means by which the
state may convey property so long as the benefits of the trust for the public
remain paramount or the state remains in proprietary control. 81 The outcome
of Nedtweg turned in part on both of these considerations. The legislative
action in question was the leasing of lots to private persons suitable for
cottages and summer homes. The court found that the Michigan legislature
did not violate the public trust doctrine in leasing this land because the
conveyance was structured as a lease, and furthermore, the conveyance was
IND. CODE § 14-26-2.1-4(d).
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Mich. 2005).
77 Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54 (Mich. 1926) (citing Illinois Central, 146 U.S.
387 (1892)); People v. Kirk (Lakeshore Drive Case), 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896); Saunders v. N.Y.
Cent., 38 N.E. 992 (N.Y. 1894).
78 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64.
79 Id. at 65 (quoting Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 53).
80 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65.
81 Id.
75
76
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a decision of the legislature as to “whether the public interests will be best
served by leaving the lake bottom . . . or permit use thereof . . . to the greater
benefit of the public.” 82 Therefore, the legislature was not abdicating their
rights, but rather the conveyance was made subject to the public trust 83 and
for a greater public benefit. 84 Therefore, in Michigan, the legislature has
significant leeway with regards to public trust lands so long as they do not
abdicate both the property and the sovereignty over it, which makes lease
structures effective.
While the exceptions are comparatively clearer in Michigan, there
remains uncertainty with regards to the standards in judging public interest
and public control. 85 While Nedtweg stands as an example of conveyance
overcoming public trust scrutiny, no standard has been set beyond the court
stating that there is not a strict prohibition on the disposal of lake bottomlands
and that this is consistent with Illinois Central. 86 This uncertainty leaves
important questions unanswered, and project developers need to overcome
this uncertainty in any offshore wind project under the current legal regime. 87
4. Minnesota
Minnesota also recognizes the public trust doctrine as a common-law
principle, noting that Illinois Central was the first case in which this principle
was formally recognized.88 Rather than explicitly adopting the holdings of
Illinois Central, Minnesota has recognized what they call the “common-law
public trust doctrine.” 89 This doctrine was first recognized in Minnesota, just
one year after Illinois Central, with the Minnesota Supreme Court stating,
In this state, we have adopted the common law on the subject of
waters, with certain modifications, suited to the difference in
conditions between this country and England, . . . and . . . we have
repudiated the doctrine that the state has any private or proprietary
right (as had the king) in navigable waters, but that it holds them in its
sovereign capacity, as trustee for the people, for public use. 90

The Minnesota doctrine recognizes the same rationale and principles as
Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 54-55.
Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65 (citing Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 54-55).
84 Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 54-55.
85 Id. at 57.
86 Id.
87 Justices have even acknowledged the difficulties of adjudicating the public trust
doctrine, even going so far as to state, “the . . . confused precedent that we all have valiantly
struggled to decipher.” Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 81 (Young, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
88 White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n ex rel. State v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 946
N.W.2d 373, 385 (Minn. 2020).
89 Id.
90 Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
82
83
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in Illinois Central, with the core of the doctrine being the protection of public
use from “private interruption and encroachment.” 91 Primarily, this policy
statement shows the powerful belief that the public trust doctrine in
Minnesota is innately an anti-development doctrine, especially when the
conveyance will be to private interests.
Minnesota stated the general rule for exceptions of conveyances to
private interests in State v. Longyear Holding Co. 92 In that case, the court
said that the state has a “right as trustee to dispose of beneficial interests in
such lands, provided that in doing so it (a) acted for the benefit of all the
citizens, and (b) did not violate the primary purpose of its trust, namely, to
maintain such waters for navigation and other public uses.” 93 This statement
sets forth the standard which Minnesota applies to determine what would
generally be considered the public benefit exception to the public trust
doctrine. Furthermore, the court recognized the private use of land is not in
violation of the doctrine when the state does not alienate the land or deprive
the public of its use or rights in the land. 94 In that case, the court found that
lease conveyance for use to Lake Mining Company for extraction of ore was
not in violation of the public trust doctrine as the land was not alienated from
public hands and the use by the private interests was a benefit to the public. 95
However, this ruling must be contrasted with State v. Slotness, which
held that the condemning and conveyance of former lakebed lands for
highway use was in violation of the public trust. 96 The court notes that “the
construction of a public highway . . . is not remotely connected with
navigation or any other water-connected public use. It is a land use and
nothing more.” In doing so, the court explicitly refused to “extend the holding
in Longyear beyond the unique situation upon which it was decided.” 97 This
holding raises questions and certainly perpetuates the uncertainty as to how
offshore wind development might be treated under the current Minnesota
doctrine.
Thus, Minnesota has exceptions to public trust scrutiny, however, the
exact standards are uncertain, and the public trust doctrine has still been used
to stop development. These exceptions to the public trust doctrine are similar
to the exceptions we have seen in other states: (1) that land is used for the
public benefit, or (2) that the public retains some measure of control of the
public trust property. As the foundational principles of Minnesota’s public
trust doctrine are inherently anti-development, the standards for the
exceptions are not clear, and public trust scrutiny has stood in the way of
White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, 946 N.W.2d at 386.
State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1947).
93 Id. at 670.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Compare State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Minn. 1971), with People v. Kirk,
45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896).
97 Slotness, 185 N.W.2d at 533.
91
92
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development in the past, there is a significant risk posed to offshore wind
development under the current legal regime.
5. New York
The public trust doctrine in New York has been applied broadly and has
been in place since shortly after Illinois Central. 98 The Court of Appeals of
New York, citing Illinois Central, adopted the public trust principles first in
Saunders v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., stating that the state
holds the lands under navigable waters in trust for the public. 99 However, the
anti-development principles of other states have not been the trend in New
York. In Saunders, in determining whether a railroad company could retain
title to lands below the original high-water mark of the Hudson River, the
court established broad exceptions to the general Illinois Central principles.
These exceptions are rooted in public interest, as in other states, but are much
more sweeping. In Saunders, the court stated,
While the state holds the title to lands under navigable waters, in a
certain sense, as trustee for the public, it is competent for the supreme
legislative power to authorize and regulate grants of the same for
public, or such other purposes as it may determine to be for the best
interests of the state, and the legislature has conferred power upon the
commissioners of the land office to make such grants for railroad
purposes. 100

Therefore, even when presented with a substantially similar factual
situation to that of Illinois Central, the court found that the state possessed
the right to make a grant of land to railroads because of the public benefit of
transportation of the railroad achieved by the legislative grant. 101
The breadth of the exceptions to public trust doctrine scrutiny has been
cited repeatedly by the courts of the state. In Long Sault Development Co. v.
Kennedy, the court went so far as to say:
The power of the Legislature to grant land under navigable waters to
private persons or corporations for beneficial enjoyment has been
exercised too long and has been affirmed by this court too often to be
open to serious question at this late date . . . the contemplated use,
however, must be reasonable and one which can fairly be said to be

98 For example, recent public trust cases such as Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks and Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 797 (N.Y. 2014) deal with public trust
questions extending all the way to the placement of restaurants in city parks.
99 Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y. 1894).
100 Id. at 994-95.
101 Id. (stating “the land which a railroad corporation acquires in this state, though it may
be technically called a fee, is for the use as a public highway, and this is a use for the benefit
of the public . . . .”).
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for the public benefit or not injurious to the public. 102

Citing Coxe v. State of N.Y., 103 the court further states, “[f]or every
purpose which may be useful, convenient, or necessary to the public, the state
has the unquestionable right to make grants in fee or conditionally for the
beneficial use of the grantee, or to promote commerce according to their
terms.” 104 Thus, despite the public trust doctrine being adopted by the state,
the exceptions are so broad that public trust scrutiny does not often stand in
the way of development of public trust lands. 105 The legislature has been
given the freedom to determine the public benefit and make conveyance in
accordance with such a determination. But this power has not been absolute,
as exemplified in the holding of Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy.
There, the court found that the grant of the lands “virtually turns over to the
corporation entire control of navigation at the Long Sault rapids,” abdicating
the future duties of the state under the public trust. 106 While the case provides
broad exceptions, the express language also exemplifies both antidevelopment and anti-monopoly principles.
These conclusions create an inherent confusion and murkiness about the
doctrine and its exceptions. While there is broad authority conferred upon the
legislature, the doctrine has still stood in the way of development. The
deference to the legislature further raises many of the same unanswered
issues as discussed above, including questions about the role of state
legislative determinations, the extent to which states can define public trust
standards, and the standards by which public trust exceptions will be judged.
While it seems that New York has an easier pathway to offshore
development, these questions linger, and so long as they remain unanswered,
there is a risk posed to offshore wind development by the public trust
doctrine.
6. Ohio
The general public trust doctrine principle of Ohio is stated in State v.
Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad Co. 107 The Supreme Court of Ohio stated,
“the state as trustee for the public cannot, by acquiescence, abandon the trust
property or enable a diversion of it to private ends different from the object
for which the trust was created.” 108 In citing Illinois Central, the court
concluded that title of lands under Lake Erie resides with the state and that
Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 105 N.E. 849, 851-52 (N.Y. 1914).
Coxe v. State of N.Y., 39 N.E. 400, 402 (N.Y. 1895).
104 Long Sault Dev. Co., 105 N.E. at 852.
105 See also People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916) (confirming the
principles of the many New York cases in which public trust lands have been conveyed to
private interests).
106 Id.
107 State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916).
108 Id.
102
103
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land is held for the trust of the public. 109 Following State v. Cleveland &
Pittsburgh Railroad Co., Ohio codified the public trust doctrine in the
Fleming Act of 1917. The current public trust doctrine of Ohio is codified in
state statute, stating in relevant part:
It is hereby declared that the waters of Lake Erie consisting of the
territory within the boundaries of the state, extending from the
southerly shore of Lake Erie to the international boundary line
between the United States and Canada, together with the soil beneath
and their contents, do now belong and have always, since the
organization of the state of Ohio, belonged to the state as proprietor
in trust for the people of the state, for the public uses to which they
may be adapted, subject to the powers of the United States
government, to the public rights of navigation, water commerce, and
fishery, and to the property rights of littoral owners, including the
right to make reasonable use of the waters in front of or flowing past
their lands. 110

Exceptions are further codified in statute:
Whenever the state . . . upon application of any person who wants to
develop or improve part of the [submerged lands of Lake Erie] . . .
determines that any part of the territory can be developed and
improved or waters thereof used as specified in the application
without impairment of the public right . . . a lease of all or any part of
the state’s interest therein may be entered into with the applicant. 111

This exception encompasses the two major general exceptions in the
public trust doctrine we have seen so far and makes them conjunctive: the
conveyance must be in the public interest and must remain in the control of
the state through a lease rather than in fee.
It is under this framework that the court analyzes public trust doctrine
arguments. For example, in Lemley v. Stevenson, the court found that a lease
of submerged lands to preserve a historic dock and to prevent shoreline
erosion was in the public benefit, and the legislature and administrative
agencies followed the process codified in statute to make such a grant, and
therefore there was no violation of the Ohio public trust doctrine. 112
However, Ohio’s pubic trust jurisprudence has focused greatly on the rights
of littoral landowners and has noted that “the state as trustee for the public
cannot, by acquiescence, abandon the trust property or enable a diversion of
109 Lemley v. Stevenson, 661 N.E.2d 237, 242 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1995) (citing State
v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916)). See also State ex rel.
Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948).
110 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1506.10 (West 2020).
111 Id. § 1506.11.
112 Lemley, 661 N.E.2d at 243-44.
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it to private ends different from the object for which the trust was created.” 113
This case, and those similar, reiterate the idea that the public trust doctrine in
Ohio is an anti-development principle, and any conveyance will be restricted
within the bounds described above. Even in littoral disputes, the public trust
doctrine has served to halt development and/or reverse it. For example, in
Schnittker v. State, the court held that the Department of Natural Resources
had the power to regulate littoral land uses under the public trust doctrine,
and a failure to submit to those regulations gave the state the power to remove
the dock of a littoral landowner. 114
Therefore, the uncertainty in the application of the Ohio public trust
doctrine to the Great Lake’s submerged lands and the unclear standards
regarding the public purpose and public rights exceptions creates ambiguities
which pose a risk to development of offshore wind in Ohio.
7. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania adopted, pre-Illinois Central, the common law concept
that submerged lands are held by the state and for the trust of the public. 115
As a general principle, the court held that the state could not dispose of
property so held to a private individual for private use. 116 Generally, these
public rights include the public’s rights of navigation, fishing, and other
public trust uses. 117 Pennsylvania follows Illinois Central, with the court
stating, “title to the underlying submerged land remains in the
Commonwealth and may not be alienated in fee by the Commonwealth
government.” 118 Most precedent in Pennsylvania relating to the standards of
the public trust doctrine falls under adjudication of conveyances under the
Pennsylvania “Donated or Dedicated Property Act” (DDPA). 119 This act sets
forth that donation or dedication of land to a municipality for a public use is
“held by [the] political subdivision as trustee, for the benefit of the public
with full legal title in the said trustee.”120 It is under this analysis that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth this general statement for the
public trust doctrine as “the common law public trust doctrine strictly
prohibits a governmental body from conveying public lands to an entity or
Schnittker v. State, No. 00AP-976, 2001 WL 410280, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist.
Apr. 24, 2001) (citing State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio
1916)).
114 Id.
115 Poor v. McClure, 77 Pa. 214, 219 (Pa. 1873).
116 Id.
117 Kilbert, supra note 58, at 55 n.314 (citing a variety of Pennsylvania cases and legal
opinions which qualify riparian rights to the public trust).
118 Delaware Ave., L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 997 A.2d 1231, 1233 n.4
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing The New York and Erie R.R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. 175 (1859)
and City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 130 A. 491 (Pa. 1925)).
119 53 P.S. §§ 3381–3386 (1959).
120 Id. § 3382
113
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person for private use.” 121
While setting forth this general rule, however, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has readily acknowledged confusion in applying the public
trust doctrine. The court has stated, “we also recognize that the ‘public trust
doctrine’ does not set forth universally applicable black letter law . . . scholars
of public trust law . . . acknowledge that the ‘amorphous’ public trust concept
merely provides a potential tool through which citizens may attempt to
develop a comprehensive approach to natural resource management.” 122 The
court further notes “the constitutional and legislative variations among the
states approach the infinite.” 123
Under the existing DDPA precedent, Pennsylvania has thwarted the
development of these public trust lands. In a challenge of a conveyance of
park land to a developer, the court held that the conveyance would allow the
dedicated parcels to be used for residential housing, a private purpose that
was in violation of the doctrine. 124 Furthermore, the court rejected an
argument that the conveyance was not in fee, rather via easement, by noting
that the easement was a land interest that allowed for control of the land in
violation of the public trust. 125 While not explicitly stated, the case law
indicates two critical factors, yet again, to Pennsylvania public trust analysis:
(1) whether the land will be put to use for a public purpose; and (2) whether
the commonwealth retains or conveys control over that land to the private
interest. The lack of precedent and the uncertainty of these exceptions in
Pennsylvania pose a risk to current offshore wind projects. Without clear
guidance as to cases involving the development of submerged lands of the
Great Lakes, public trust scrutiny and potential litigation serve as a barrier to
the proliferation of offshore wind projects in Pennsylvania.
8. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin public trust doctrine has been found to be rooted in the
Wisconsin State Constitution article IX, Section 1. 126 It is notable that it has
In re Borough of Downingtown, 161 A.3d 844, 877 (Pa. 2017) (citing Payne v. Kassab,
361 A.2d 263, 268 (Pa. 1976) and Bd. of Tr. of Phila. Museums v. Tr. of Univ. of Pa., 96 A.
123, 123-24 (Pa. 1915)).
122 Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911,
933 n.26 (Pa. 2017).
123 Id. (citing William H. Rodgers Jr., Handbook on Environmental Law, § 2.16 (West Pub.
Co. 1977)).
124 In re Borough of Downingtown, 161 A.3d 844, 877 (Pa. 2017).
125 Id.
126 Borsellino v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 606 N.W.2d 255, 261 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). WIS.
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all rivers and lakes
bordering on this state so far as such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to the state
and any other state or territory now or hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence,
and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, as well
to the inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost or
121
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further been found by the courts of Wisconsin that the doctrine originated in
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 127 Out of this section of the constitution,
the court has found, “the state holds the beds of navigable waters in trust for
public use.” 128 As a general principle, the Wisconsin State Legislature has
the power to regulate and enforce these public trust principles, 129 and has
used this power to expand and clarify the doctrine. 130 The public trust
doctrine serves to protect the historic right of navigation but has been further
expanded to include other public uses for various purposes. 131 After
recognizing the public trust doctrine is found in the constitution, the court
has imported the principles of the doctrine from Illinois Central and public
trust scholarship. Generally, the Wisconsin public trust doctrine is “premised
on the idea that private ownership of public resources is improper and
provides the public with a right to the benefit of certain public resources.” 132
In adjudicating public trust doctrine disputes in the Great Lakes, the court
has applied these general principles of Illinois Central. 133 In applying these
principles, the court has prevented development of public trust lands, as was
the case in ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Nat. Res., where the court
found that the conversion of a marina to a condominium violated the public
trust doctrine as it would vest control over the trust lands to private
individuals. 134
The Wisconsin public trust doctrine also imports the two exceptions
from Illinois Central: that the doctrine is not violated if the state does not
abdicate control, and that the state may lose control over the trust resources
for “such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein.” 135 In stark contrast to People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist.
duty therefor.”).
127 R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787-88 (Wis. 2001).
128 Borsellino v. Wisconsin Dept. of Nat. Res., 606 Wis.2d 430, 443 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
129 ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Nat. Res., 648 N.W2d 854, 858 (Wis. 2002).
130 Evann D. S. Derus, A New Must of the Public Trust: Modifying Wisconsin’s Public
Trust Doctrine to Accommodate Modern Development While Still Serving the Doctrine’s
Essential Goals, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 456 (2015). It has further been found that “the
legislature may authorize limited encroachments upon the beds of navigable waters when it
will serve the public interests,” often being applied to private docks and the like, but
inapplicable for our purposes. Borsellino, 606 Wis.2d at 443.
131 ABKA Ltd. P’ship, 648 N.W2d at 858; R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781,
787-88 (Wis. 2001). Because of this expanse, Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine has been seen
as one of the most protective of the Great Lakes states. Derus, supra note 130, at 457.
132 ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Nat. Res., 635 N.W.2d 168, 179 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2002). While this case was affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on other grounds,
the court adopted the reasoning of this court in terms of setting forth the public trust doctrine
principles. See ABKA Ltd. P’ship, 648 N.W.2d 854. See also R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d
at 787-88.
133 E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 214 N.W. 820, 832 (Wis. 1923).
134 ABKA Ltd. P’ship, 648 N.W.2d at 858.
135 City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W at 832. Note that as the definition of public use in the
public trust doctrine has expanded, it logically expands this exception as well, as the
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from Illinois, the Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted a conveyance of land
to the Illinois Steel Company, holding that the conveyance was in the public
interest. 136 As a factor in whether the public purpose was primary or
incidental in the conveyance, the court considered whether the grant of the
land was part of a larger plan intending to bring a benefit to the public. The
court found that the conveyance of the land to the Illinois Steel Company was
part of an “entire plan” to aid the city in navigation and commerce, and thus
the primary purpose of the conveyance was public in nature. 137 The court
further relies on previous precedent, which relied upon public health and
public welfare benefits in finding private use of trust land allowable as a
public benefit. 138 This sets forth the understanding that, while as a basis the
public trust doctrine is anti-development, the exceptions do, in fact, allow
change to be brought to the trust lands. 139 The outer limit is set—a
conveyance for the sole benefit of private parties will not pass public trust
scrutiny—however, there is a lack of clarity as to where the line sits between
conveyance for public health and welfare and a purely private conveyance. 140
The only guidance on this standard is in State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, where
the court looked to five persuasive factors in finding the grant of land for
park purposes, even though title will be held by private interests. 141 The court
noted,
1. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2. The area will be
devoted to public purposes and open to the public. 3. The diminution
of lake area will be very small when compared with the whole of Lake
Wingra. 4. No one of the public uses of the lake as a lake will be
destroyed or greatly impaired. 5. The disappointment of those
members of the public who may desire to boat, fish or swim in the
area to be filled is negligible when compared with the greater
convenience to be afforded those members of the public who use the
city park. 142

These factors point to many of the same exception factors, such as
public control, public use, and interference with existing public uses. While
this clearly shows that the Wisconsin public trust doctrine does not prohibit
transfers of trust lands, the transfer must meet this public purpose test which
remains unclear. Accordingly, while Wisconsin seemingly defines public
interest more broadly than other states, the uncertainty of the doctrine and the
exception standard, with only the five factors listed above to look to,
conveyance may be allowed so long as it is in the “improvement of the interest thus held.”
136 Id.
137 Id. at 830.
138 Id. at 830-31.
139 See Derus, supra note 130, at 457.
140 Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 918 (Wis. 1896).
141 State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Wis. 1957).
142 Id.

142

Public Trust and Offshore Wind Development in the Great Lakes
42:117 (2021)

continues to leave potential developers with uncertainty in terms of public
trust scrutiny and potential litigation. While it may have been easy for the
court to find a park with public access was in the public interest, the
translatability of these factors to other analyses leaves questions remaining
for any project proposed to use the submerged lands of the Great Lakes.
C. Public Trust Doctrine Conclusions
These preceding analyses illustrate the difficulty of navigating the
public trust doctrine of each state, even if it is possible to find the “guiding
principle” of that state. While every state has adopted the public interest
exception and has quoted Illinois Central for the guiding principles, the
outcomes of the cases discussed still do not provide clear answers to whether
future projects would or would not fall at the hands of the public trust
doctrine. The confusion lies not always in the variance between the states,
but within each individual public trust doctrine. As is frequently the case
when analyzing this doctrine, the confusion often prevails.
The foregoing discussion (albeit more of an acknowledgement of the
confusion surrounding the doctrine) exemplifies the two major ways in which
the public trust doctrine stands as a barrier to offshore wind farm
development. First, there may be substantive claims as to whether the
elements of the public trust doctrine are met. While there is likely no clear
answer in any public trust doctrine case, it is clear that at the core, the public
trust doctrine is an anti-development doctrine, and therefore, questions will
always arise when a project proposal is discussing development of
submerged public trust lands. Offshore wind projects require development of
submerged lands of the Great Lakes, and the parties who have the means and
expertise to engage in such development are often private companies. As
with all business, the purpose of these projects is primarily to make money.
Based on the core principle that conveyance of public trust lands to private
interests is in violation of the doctrine, there are questions about the viability
of such projects to pass public trust scrutiny.
Second, the uncertainty itself may be fatal to offshore wind projects.
Each state serves as a breeding ground for litigation, project delays, and
overall cost increases. Top scholars have spent decades attempting to
determine the principles of the public trust doctrine. Even so, the confusion
perpetuates, and no more than a few common threads have been found. This
uncertainty leaves project developers at risk of cost increases due to lengthy
public challenges, insecurity about compliance with legal requirements, and
an ultimate lack of knowing whether a project may come to fruition. 143 Such
143 As the solution posed is an international agreement, it is worth noting that Canada also
has the concept of the public trust doctrine. While Canada’s doctrine is similar to its U.S.
counterpart, environmentally focused litigants have attempted to protect natural resources in
a number of cases by raising the public trust doctrine but have never succeeded. For a longer
discussion of the Canadian public trust doctrine and how it has thus far been unsuccessful as
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unknowns can often delay, derail, or completely end these major projects. 144
One salient example of this exact concern came out of the Cape Wind project,
the first offshore wind farm proposed in the United States.145 While not a
Great Lakes project, the threat of litigation from a variety of groups included
claims on public trust doctrine grounds. 146 The court ultimately found that
there was no violation of the public trust doctrine; however, the project was
delayed for nearly a decade because of this litigation, drastically increasing
the costs on the developer. 147 The very nature of the public trust doctrine and
the confusion likely will continue to breed these claims. 148
While these barriers are often recognized by wind energy supporters,
contemporary solutions have fallen short thus far. 149 I turn now to a new
solution to these problems: an international agreement structured to comply
with the exceptions to the public trust doctrine and spur development of wind
energy in the Great Lakes.
III. AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY WITH STATES ADOPTING
THROUGH INTERSTATE COMPACT HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO
UNLOCK THE POTENTIAL OF THE GREAT LAKES AND INFORM
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ANALYSES BY SHOWING THAT
DEVELOPMENT IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
In light of this tremendous legal uncertainty analyzed in the prior
sections, any framework for offshore wind development in the Great Lakes
must be structured to minimize the legal barriers posed by the public trust
doctrine. Notwithstanding all the confusion existing in the public trust
a litigation strategy, see Vladislav Mukhomedzyanov, Canadian Public Trust Doctrine at
Common Law: Requirements and Effectiveness, 32 J. ENVTL. L. PRAC. 317 (2019).
144 For example, the Cape Wind Associates project off the coast of Massachusetts took
nearly a decade to litigate, and the Icebreaker wind project in Ohio experienced similar delays.
145 Hanna Conger, Comment, A Lesson from Cape Wind: Implementation of Offshore
Wind Energy in the Great Lakes Should Occur Through Multi-State Cooperation, 42 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 741, 752-58 (2011).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 756-57.
148 Id. (“Every future offshore wind farm must contend with the relevant state’s public trust
doctrine, since each state is obligated to abide by the Doctrine, and each wind farm must
transmit its electricity to customers on the mainland via transmission cables like those at issue
in this case.”). For example, the Lake Erie Energy Development Corp. (LEEDCo) was
developed a decade ago with the goal of bringing offshore wind to the Great Lakes and is just
now potentially breaking through. Jeffrey Tomich, Great Lakes Offshore Wind—Possibility
or Pipe Dream?, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:23 AM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1061403233.
149 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Create a Great Lakes Offshore Wind Energy
Consortium to Coordinate Issues of Regional Applicability for the Purpose of Promoting the
Efficient, Expeditious, Orderly and Responsible Evaluation of Offshore Wind Power Project
in the Great Lakes (2012), https://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/great_lakes_offshore_
wind_energy_consortium_mou.pdf, was signed in 2012 and little progress has been made to
overcome these barriers.
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doctrine, as we have seen, there are two common exception threads that
minimize public trust concerns and may allow development to overcome
public trust scrutiny. While no solution will completely deal with this public
trust uncertainty, these exceptions and common threads pose the most
promising way to structure a legal regime and development deals for offshore
wind turbines. As shown throughout the analysis of the public trust doctrines
of the eight Great Lakes states, the two major exception factors which can
enable the public trust doctrine to be overcome are (1) if the state keeps title
to the land or some other mechanism in which the state preserves control over
the land; and (2) if the project is indisputably in the public benefit or does not
impair public interest. 150 Generally, courts analyze both of these factors in
determining whether a transaction complies with the public trust doctrine. 151
The difficulty then becomes structuring development projects and a
legal regime in a way that maximizes these two elements. Perhaps the most
promising way to do so is to establish an international agreement with a
subsequent interstate compact. Making a clear statement on the public
interest benefits of offshore wind and laying a public foundation for the
structure of any private development deals will allow developers more
certainty in engaging in these projects.
A. Overcoming Public Trust Doctrine Violations Through the Exceptions
Set Forth in the Doctrine.
1. Title Remains in the Public or the Grant is Subject to Public Control.
As discussed above, one common exception to the public trust doctrine
occurs when the state retains control of the lands, or the title remains in the
state. The foundation of this exception is set forth in Illinois Central. The
Court stated, “[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under
150 E.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Justice Fields states, “The control of the state for
the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interests of the public therein.” He further states, “The state can no more abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
underneath them, so as to leave them entirely under the use or control of private parties . . .
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation
of the peace.” This has been interpreted to authorize small privatizations of trust resources
where the bulk of the trust resources remain public. Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649,
660
(July
2010),
https://www.law.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2351/f/downloads/
ThePublicTrustDoctrineandPrivateProperty.pdf. See also supra Part II (analyzing Great Lakes
states public trust doctrine and the exceptions of each state).
151 E.g., Lake Michigan Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F. Supp. 441,
445 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (analyzing the structure of the conveyance to Loyola University of public
trust land and intended use of that land and holding it in violation of the public trust doctrine
because the state did not retain proper public control and the use was not sufficiently in the
public interest).
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the use and control of private parties.” 152 This has been recognized by courts
as allowing grants of public trust land in certain cases where the public
continues to control the land. This exception is shown in many of the Great
Lakes states’ public trust doctrines, as discussed above. For example, in
Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park District, a grant of public trust land to the
Chicago Bears was found to not be in violation of the doctrine because “the
park district will continue in its previous capacity as landlord under a lease
agreement with the Bears and will continue in its existing role as owner of
the remainder of the Burnham Park property.” 153 Cases such as these stand
for the fact that simply because a transaction leaves trust land benefitting
private parties, it does not mean that there will be a violation of the
doctrine. 154 However, this exception continues to be restrictively applied in
certain circumstances. For example, the court found in Lake Michigan
Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that Illinois’ retention of a right
of reentry and other conditions of conveyance was not sufficient to constitute
retention of public control over the public trusts lands with which Loyola
would take ownership. 155
Another generally applied consideration under this exception is the
magnitude of the land grant. In Illinois Central, the Court takes special note
of the fact that the grant to the railroad encompassed more than 1,000 acres
and the impact of this land on the commerce of Chicago. 156 Throughout the
opinion, the Court acknowledges that the public trust has been violated when
a purely private corporation has been granted, in essence, a monopoly as the
railroad had been. 157 Therefore, smaller magnitude trust conveyances, where
there remains a degree of private control, seemly set forth an example of the
type of project that, even under the public trust doctrine uncertainty, pass
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 170 (Ill. 2003).
154 Id. (“The results do not violate the public trust doctrine even though the Bears also
benefit from the completed project.”). See also Sax, supra note 29, at 486-87 (“The first point
that must be clearly understood is that there is no general prohibition against the disposition
of trust properties.”).
155 Lake Michigan Federation, 742 F. Supp. at 445.
156 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454 (“The area of the submerged lands proposed to be
ceded by the act in question to the railroad company embraces something more than 1,000
acres, being, as stated by counsel, more than three times the area of the outer harbor, and not
only including all of that harbor, but embracing adjoining submerged lands, which will, in all
probability, be hereafter included in the harbor. It is as large as that embraced by all the
merchandise docks along the Thames at London; is much larger than that included in the
famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is twice that of the port of Marseilles, and nearly, if not
quite, equal to the pier area along the waterfront of the city of New York.”).
157 See Kearney, supra note 31, at 805. While Kearney and Merrill ultimately conclude
their in-depth analysis of the history of Illinois Central that the railroad was not given the
equivalent of a monopoly, they note, “Field’s chosen narrative drew a picture of a powerful
and privileged corporation endowed by a short-sighted legislature with unprecedented powers
over a traditionally public resource.”
152
153
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muster. 158
2. Public Purpose or Non-impairment of Public Interest
An additional common thread exemplified in the discussion above is
that public trust scrutiny can be overcome if the conveyance is for a public
purpose, or the conveyance will not impair the public interest in the land.
Generally, a transaction may survive public trust doctrine scrutiny if the
conveyance promotes an interest of the public. 159 Again, the exception is
generally found in Illinois Central, where the Court states,
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. 160

The most common defense to a transfer being attacked under the public
trust doctrine is that the land will be used in promoting the public interest.
Throughout the Great Lakes states, courts have found conveyances of public
trust land to be valid notwithstanding the public trust doctrine on these
grounds, as shown above. 161 In Wisconsin, the grant of public trust land to a
steel corporation for private purposes was not invalidated by the public trust
doctrine because the grant was part of a broader project which served a public
purpose of navigation and commerce. 162 Illinois found the expansion of Lake
Shore Drive over public trust lands was not in violation because the purpose
of the statute was a direct public benefit. 163 While questions remain as to the
standard for analyzing public interest or to what the extent the public interest
must be, 164 and there is a great deal of variance and confusion between states,
there is no question that projects in the public interest have the capability to
overcome public trust doctrine concerns. 165
B. How International Agreements with States Adopting Principles Through
Interstate Compact Can Overcome Public Trust Concerns.
The public trust doctrine has been shown to be generally unpredictable
Blumm, supra note 150, at 660-61.
E.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. See also supra Part II (analyzing the public trust
doctrine of each of the Great Lakes states).
160 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
161 See supra Part II (analyzing the public trust doctrine of each of the Great Lakes states).
162 See City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1923).
163 See People v. Kirk (Lakeshore Drive Case), 45 N.E. 830, 836 (Ill. 1896) (holding that
the main purpose of the act conveying the land was to allow public officials to construct a
needed extension of Lake Shore Drive for direct public benefit).
164 See Kilbert, supra note 58, at 31 n.188.
165 For a brief discussion about the exceptions to the public trust doctrine based on public
purpose, see Blumm, supra note 150, at 660-62.
158
159
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and full of confusion, and in each of the eight states, it is both difficult to
define and a barrier to development of submerged lands. Nonetheless, there
is a distinct possibility that an international agreement between the United
States and Canada, with all Great Lakes states adopting through interstate
compact, can serve to minimize public trust scrutiny and maximize the
potential to overcome these barriers. Recognizing that there are common
exceptions sewn into the public trust doctrine both generally and in each of
the Great Lakes states, such an agreement has the potential to provide a
framework for overcoming public trust doctrine concerns, thus bringing more
certainty to developers moving forward with these projects.
It must first be understood whether such a solution is legally possible
and the precedential backdrop with which these agreements would be made.
There is no question that the United States and the states therein have the
power to enter into a treaty and an interstate compact, respectively. The
President is given the power, pursuant to consent of the Senate, to make
treaties. 166 While Article I, Section 10, precludes states from entering into
any treaty themselves,167 States were conferred the power to, with the consent
of congress, enter into agreements or compacts with other states. 168
Looking at history, it is clear that the United States and Canada, as well
as the Great Lakes states, have significant precedent for making agreements
such as the one proposed here. With regard to substantive legal agreements
between the United States and Canada, the Boundary Waters Treaty169 and
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 170 provide two key examples. The
Boundary Waters Treaty established a legal framework between the two
countries with regard to obligations for navigability, commerce, and
pollution. 171 Furthermore, it delineated the powers of each government,
giving each nation the power to carry on “governmental works in boundary
waters . . . wholly on its own side of the line.” 172 The Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement worked in addition to this treaty, reinforcing a
collaborative approach to water quality in the Great Lakes and defining
166 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Note, Congress has generally not been favorable to allow
state compacts to include binding agreements with Canadian provinces with regard to the
Great Lakes. See Noah D. Hall & Benjamin C. Houston, Law and Governance of the Great
Lakes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 744-51 (2014), https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/law_
and_governance_of_the_great_lakes.pdf.
168 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
169 The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448,
https://ijc.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/Boundary Water-ENGFR.pdf.
170 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Ca.-U.S., Sept. 7, 2012, https://www.
canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/migration/main/grandslacs-greatlakes/a1c62826-72be-40dba545-65ad6fceae92/1094_canada-usa-20glwqa-20_e.pdf.
171 The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. II and III, Jan. 11, 1909, 36
Stat. 2448, https://ijc.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/Boundary Water-ENGFR.pdf.
172 Id.
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specific objectives that each party would be bound to under the agreement. 173
Generally, these major treaties can inform the structure of a treaty
between the nations with regard to offshore wind development. First, they
establish precedent on behalf of both nations to engage in legally binding
agreements which put forth new legal regimes with regard to the topic of the
Great Lakes. Furthermore, each agreement is structured in a way to
demonstrate the benefit of the agreement prior to putting forth the specific
terms of the agreement. 174 This will become critical, as discussed below, in
maximizing the treaty to set forth a favorable legal regime in the Great Lakes.
The Great Lakes states further have an established practice of entering
into interstate compacts with regard to the Great Lakes. Primarily, the Great
Lakes Basin Compact 175 set forth collaborative agreements between the Great
Lakes states on the development, conservation, and maximization of benefits
of the Great Lakes and the basin surrounding. Furthermore, these states very
recently showed a willingness to specifically support offshore wind
development in the lakes through the Great Lakes Offshore Wind Energy
Consortium Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2012. 176 Again, these
agreements highlight the benefits brought by the Compact the states were
entering into and then go on to establish the means by which this will be
accomplished and the obligations on the parties to the agreement.
Based on the foregoing discussion about the difficulties in overcoming
the public trust doctrine and the common exceptions to the doctrine, the treaty
and subsequent interstate compact (“the agreements”) adopting the principles
should primarily inform any public trust doctrine analysis. Generally, the
agreements should be structured to establish a process by which, as part of
the “Great Lakes Offshore Wind Development Project,” 177 the United States
(and the respective states) and Canada work with developers to develop
offshore wind generation farms in the Great Lakes in conformity and
recognizing these current legal boundaries.
First, the agreements should unequivocally declare, and highlight, the
public interest and benefits that are seen through the proliferation of offshore
wind development. As discussed in the introduction to this analysis, the
173 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Ca.-U.S., Sept. 7, 2012, https://www.canada.
ca/content/dam/eccc/migration/main/grandslacs-greatlakes/a1c62826-72be-40db-a54565ad6fceae92/1094_canada-usa-20glwqa-20_e.pdf.
174 E.g., The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement begins with acknowledgements of
“the vital importance of the Great Lakes to the social and economic well-being of both
countries, the close connection between quality of the Waters of the Great lakes and the
environment and human health, as well as the need to address the risks to human health posed
by environmental degradation.” Id. at 3.
175 Great Lakes Basin Compact Congressional Consent, Pub. L. No. 90-419 (1968),
https://www.glc.org/wp-content/uploads/GLC-GreatLakes-Basin-Compact-2019.pdf.
176 Memorandum to Create a Great Lakes Offshore Wind Energy Consortium (2012),
https://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/great_lakes_offshore_wind_energy_consortium_m
ou.pdf.
177 This name is inserted simply for the sake of this argument.
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development of renewable energy, but especially offshore wind energy
generation, provides distinct benefits to the public at large. Some scholars
have made the argument that there should be no public trust doctrine issues
at all with offshore wind simply based on the climate change mitigation
impacts and the public benefit that come with the development of these
generating facilities. 178 Without a doubt, renewable energy development
serves to benefit the public from impending climate implications.179 The
additional environmental benefits such as clean water and clean air also
cannot be overlooked. Distributed generation and renewable generation also
contribute to economic stability, energy security, and national security. 180
These factors all point to the public interest and benefit of such projects.
Furthermore, the agreements should emphasize that the development of
offshore wind will be done with minimal intrusion into navigation or
enjoyment of the lakes. 181 As noted above, the exceptions to public trust
scrutiny factor in the impairment of the public interest, including navigation
and enjoyment. 182 Certain processes can be implemented and steps can be
taken to develop offshore wind to minimize impacts on navigation, not only
including maritime navigation, but also air transportation and radar. 183 With
regards to maritime navigability, the farms can be developed in a fashion to
allow vessels to easily maneuver through the development with minimal
intrusion and continuing in a straight path. 184 Because the actual footprint of
the turbine is relatively small and because the turbines are quite a distance
out into the lakes, these steps will ensure that there is very little impact on
navigability and obstruction to other public enjoyment will likely be
178 E.g., Conger, supra note 145; Klass, supra note 27. As discussed in the introduction,
distributed generation in the Great Lakes has the potential to overcome many barriers
presented by the current electricity grid, including shorter transmission and renewable
generation near major metropolitan centers. These benefits have been argued to make
renewable energy generation automatically in the public interest.
179 Andrew S. Ballentine, How the Public Trust Doctrine’s Fiduciary Duty Requirement
Requires States’ Proactive Response to Promote Offshore Power Generation, 6 SEATTLE J. OF
ENVTL. L. 65 (2016), https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1060&context=sjel. Ballentine goes so far to say that, not only the public trust doctrine should
not be a barrier, but the public trust doctrine actually compels renewable energy development
because of the need to protect the environment. As Sax stated long ago, the heart of the public
trust doctrine is protecting these natural resources.
180 See, e.g., NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 19-22. See also, supra
Part I.
181 This goes to the second part of the Illinois Central statement, in which public trust lands
can be conveyed “without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.” Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
182 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
183 E.g., JON VANDERMOLEN & ERIK NORDMAN, WIND FARMS AND NAVIGATION (2014),
https://www.michiganseagrant.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Wind-Brief-9-Navigation.
pdf.
184 Id. at 8-9. It is found that a boat’s necessity to navigate through the harbor allows it to
easily maneuver through the offshore wind farm grids.
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minimal. 185 By putting processes in place which are codified in these
agreements, the certainty with regards to overcoming public trust scrutiny
can be maximized.
Agreements emphasizing these benefits further comport with the public
trust doctrine caselaw and the interpretation of the exceptions to the doctrine.
As we have seen throughout the jurisprudence of the eight Great Lakes states,
one controlling factor in any conveyance to private parties is whether the
public interest is the primary purpose or incidental. The dichotomy created
by City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin and People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park
Dist. shows how these agreements can emphasize offshore wind projects as
part of a greater project for the benefit of the public. Both cases analyzed
conveyance of public trust lands to steel corporations, but Chicago Park
District, citing and distinguishing from City of Milwaukee, noted how a
critical aspect was the larger plan which brought a benefit to the public. 186
Structuring the offshore wind agreements as an international and regional
plan for offshore development underscores the public interest and public
benefit and is itself evidence of the “larger plan” that has been held to
comport with the doctrine. Indeed, some states have squarely stated a broad
interpretation of the public interest exception, with Wisconsin going so far as
to reference benefits to public welfare. 187 An international framework for
offshore wind development, citing and highlighting these benefits explicitly,
should fit well within this exception.
The process for development established by these agreements should
then focus on the second exception to public trust doctrine scrutiny. The
agreements should set forth a process by which each state or province,
working in conjunction with their national government under the framework
of this treaty, conveys land to the developers. Because the foundation of the
United States public trust doctrine is to prevent abdication of control of
public trust lands, this process should highlight methods by which this
conveyance can be done to preserve some public control of the lands, namely
in the form of leases with control and regulatory rights remaining in the hands
of the respective governmental unit 188 (for domestic U.S. development the
state which title to the land is held would retain title).189 Structuring the
185

Id.
Compare City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 214 N.W. 820, 826 (Wis. 1923), with
People ex. rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District, 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (1976).
187 City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 826.
188 For an example of how this regulatory capacity can be structured one can look to the
current non-Great Lakes U.S. approach to offshore wind energy development through the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). Renewable
Energy on the Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN MANAGEMENT,
https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-program-overview; NATIONAL
OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 4.
189 This structure considers the exceptions to the public trust doctrine while respecting the
constitutional nature of the equal footing doctrine. As a baseline, no treaty could circumvent
the equal footing doctrine to remove title of these lands from the individual states.
186
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conveyances to preserve public control, such as a lease structure as opposed
to a sale, should further insulate an offshore wind project from public trust
scrutiny, especially if the leases are granted in an open public process, with
input from the public as to the location and use of the leased land. 190 One can
also look to other international agreements for examples of a governance and
support structure that collaboratively supports offshore wind farms. 191
A lease structure is directly in line with the state caselaw discussed
above. For example, in State v. Longyear Holding Co., the Minnesota court
found that a lease conveyance was not in violation of the public trust doctrine
because it did not alienate the lands in question from public hands or public
control. 192 The court stated, “[i]t is clear in the instant case that the state has
acted pursuant to statutory authority; that it has not parceled or alienated the
lands in question,” in regards to a lease conveyance. 193 Given that a
foundational public trust doctrine concern is that a state cannot wholly
abdicate its public trust responsibilities, this structure of leases and public
oversight will make it much more likely that an agreement will survive public
trust scrutiny.
Mindful of the “anti-monopoly” language of Illinois Central, these
agreements should also be structured to ensure diverse engagement by
developers, rather than any one project or company holding pseudomonopolies on the wind farms in the Great Lakes. Looking back to the
foundational principles of Illinois Central, it is clear that the Court strongly
factored in the sheer breadth of land grated, more than 1,000 acres of the
Chicago Harbor, worrying about a monopolization of public trust lands. 194
The very notion of land being held in public trust means that no one person
or corporation could hold exclusive rights to those lands. 195 Beyond Illinois
Central, this theme is threaded into public trust cases from the doctrine’s
Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085,
1096 (Idaho 1983). The court in Kootenai stated, “[i]n light of the Director’s findings and
conclusions, coupled with the fact of the notice and public hearing, and the fact of compliance
by the State Land Board with its statutory authority, and our above articulation of the public
trust doctrine, we hold that the issuance of this encroachment permit and license to the
Panhandle Yacht Club does not violate the public trust doctrine,” which shows the importance
of the public nature of the process in determining public trust compliance. Structuring the
process for granting leases in this fashion maximizes the conformity with this factor of the
public trust analysis that is seen across the Great Lakes states.
191 North Seas Energy Cooperation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2020), https://ec.europa.eu/
energy/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/north-seas-energy-cooperation_en#politicaldeclaration; Lamya Moosa, “The Energy Capital of the East Coast?”: Lessons Virginia Can
Learn from Cape Wind Failure and European Success in Offshore Wind Energy, 39 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 713 (2015).
192 State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 670 (Minn. 1947).
193 Id. at 670.
194 See Kearney, supra note 31, at 805; see also Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen
Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2017),
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2215&context=ealr.
195 Blumm & Moses, supra note 194, at 7.
190
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foundation. For example, in Arnold v. Mundy, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey used the public trust doctrine to prohibit the monopolization of tidal
lands for oyster harvesting. 196 Again in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, the Court
extended this principle and held that the state holds all submerged lands as a
sovereign owner, preventing monopolization of the trust resources. 197 As the
public trust doctrine has expanded into other areas of natural resources, these
same antimonopoly considerations have been key to public trust analyses. 198
Accordingly, to address this antimonopoly factor in public trust
analysis, the agreements should establish a structure to ensure diverse
corporate and private engagement and landholdings. The agreements should
set guidelines and metrics to explicitly monitor this factor and proactively
prevent any such monopolized landholdings, which will, in turn, minimize
public trust risk.
Finally, structuring the agreement as an international treaty serves to set
a foundation for any future findings that, at the federal level, offshore wind
development is in the public benefit. This further reinforces the fact that the
offshore wind projects done pursuant to the treaty are in the public benefit,
for a public purpose, and should survive public trust scrutiny.
C. An International Agreement and Interstate Compact Would Exemplify
Public Interest.
Beyond the support from the language and structure of the agreements,
additional support for wind energy meeting these public trust exceptions lies
in the solution itself. First, the simple fact that an international treaty and an
interstate compact have been reached and ratified exemplifies that the
development of wind energy in the great lakes is in the public interest. . While
there is no requirement for treaties to be in the public interest, the Supreme
Court has alluded to the idea that treaties themselves exemplify the public
interest. For example, in upholding the Migratory Birds Treaty and Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918 the Court noted, “[h]ere a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national
action in concert with that of another power.” 199 The Court explicitly tied the
national interest in the subject matter to the power of the President, with the
consent of Congress, to enter into an international treaty. 200 Courts have
further acknowledged that “there is a significant public interest in complying
with international treaty obligations.” 201
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821); Blumm & Moses, supra note 194, at 9.
Martin, 41 U.S. at 417-18; Blumm & Moses, supra note 194, at 9.
198 Blumm & Moses, supra note 194 (discussing how the public trust doctrine has
prevented monopolization of wildlife resources in tidal and inland waters and protected from
monopolization of other public trust resources).
199 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
200 Id.
201 E.g., In re Any & all funds or other assets in Brown Bros. Harriman & Co. Account
No. 8870792 in the name of Tiger Eye Investments Ltd., No. CIV.A. 08-MC-0807, 2009 WL
196
197
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Additionally, adopting an international treaty requires congressional
approval and entering an interstate compact requires approval of each state
legislature. The fact that Congress must overcome the inherent difficulty in
approving legislation should not be overlooked in the public interest analysis.
Furthermore, there is a school of public trust scholarship that notes that states
have significant leeway to set and enforce their public trust doctrines. 202 The
caselaw of the various states discussed above similarly alludes to state
legislatures having a role in public trust determinations. 203 Four out of the
eight Great Lakes states 204 explicitly reference legislative power to determine
public interest and public benefit for public trust lands. By reaching such an
interstate compact and recognizing the importance of an international treaty,
these states would be making an explicit statement that they believe it is
unequivocally within the public interest, under the frameworks established
by the treaty and compact, for offshore wind energy to be developed in the
Great Lakes. The inherent public interest of such agreements show the
strength of this solution for overcoming public trust risk. In addition,
compared to solely inter-state cooperation, the international framework
suggested here provides an extra layer of reasoning to overcome public trust
concerns. 205
IV. QUESTIONS MAY ARISE AS ENERGY MAY BE PRODUCED
FOR OUT OF STATE OR INTERNATIONAL CONSUMERS;
HOWEVER, EXISTING PROPERTY DOCTRINE MAY PROVIDE A
WINDOW INTO HOW THESE ARGUMENTS MAY BE OVERCOME.
As we have seen, an international treaty with a corresponding interstate
agreement has tremendous potential to overcome the public trust
uncertainties that pose a barrier to offshore wind development in the Great
Lakes. A treaty can be structured in a way to satisfy the exceptions to the
public trust doctrine by setting forth a regime that subjects the development
to public control and also signifies how such development would be in the
public interest. However, there is one foreseeable issue that would be
613717, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2009).
202 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[I]t has been
long established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”) (emphasis
added); see also ELLIOTT, supra note 38, at 11-14.
203 E.g., Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54 (Mich. 1926) (“It is competent for the
supreme legislative power to authorize and regulate grants of the same for public, or such
other purposes as it may determine to be for the best interests of the state.”); ABKA Ltd. P’ship
v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Nat. Res., 635 N.W.2d 168, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (noting the
regulation and enforcement of the public trust doctrine rests with the legislature and
Department of Natural Resources).
204 Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See supra part II.
205 Compare with Conger, supra note 145. Conger argues that offshore wind energy in the
Great Lakes should occur through multi-state cooperation. The proposed international
framework here provides an extra layer to overcoming public trust concerns.
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especially salient with any regional and multinational agreement regarding
energy production. Due to the nature of electricity generation and the power
grid, the energy that is generated on public trust lands in one state may be
exported to and consumed by individuals outside of that state.
One possible reading of the public trust doctrine is that it reserves public
trust resources for the people of the state in which the public trust resources
are held. In Illinois Central, for example, the Court stated, “the ownership
[of the lands under navigable waters] is a subject of public concern to the
whole people of the state . . . being held by the whole people for purposes in
which the whole people are interested.” 206 While this language is somewhat
vague, the notion that public trust resources may be reserved only for citizens
of that state owning the land is further supported by the vesting of the rights
to navigable waters and the lands underneath in the “people” of that state as
an outgrowth of the equal footing doctrine. 207 Courts have stated this
generally as, “the public trust doctrine applies to lands . . . which are held by
the State in fee simple for the trust of its citizens.” 208 Even when state public
trust doctrines define “its citizens” broadly, such as “the state holds public
trust lands for the benefit of all citizens,” 209 because the public trust doctrine
is an outgrowth of the equal footing doctrine and individual state title, it
seems as though the citizens for which the lands are held are only the citizens
of the state which owns the land. Courts have considered the implications of
the use of public trust resources by non-state citizens in analyzing public trust
concerns. For example, in White Bear Lake Restoration Association ex rel.
State v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, the court stated that it
was unwilling to hold groundwater use affecting a public trust lake to be in
violation of the public trust doctrine in part because “homeowners did not
allege that water has been diverted out of the state.” 210 Thus, use of public
trust resources in a manner not reserved for the citizens of that state raises
public trust concerns.
If a court chose to apply the doctrine in a way that restricts use of public
trust resources to citizens of that state, there might be a significant problem
with respect to offshore wind projects due to the nature of electricity
generation and the grid system in the United States. While oftentimes the
power generated by these offshore wind turbines would be consumed by
citizens of that state, for example, a wind turbine off the shore of Milwaukee
generating power consumed by residents of Milwaukee, there is a chance that
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455-56.
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
208 State v. Oliver, 727 A.2d 491, 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (citing Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
209 For example, such a broad statement is made by the state of Virginia, but the phrase
“all citizens” is a reference to the citizens of that state. See Palmer v. Commonwealth Marine
Res. Comm’n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
210 White Bear Lake Restoration Association ex rel. State v. Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources, 946 N.W.2d 373, 385 (Minn. 2020).
206
207
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the energy would enter the grid and the end user would be a non-resident of
the state. This is because the energy grid in the United States is split into three
interconnections 211 and within those interconnections further split into
regional wholesale electricity markets. 212 These interconnections inherently
mean that once the electricity is put into the grid, there is no certainty 213 that
the end user will, or will not, be a resident of the state in which the energy
was produced. While most often power generated will be consumed within a
close proximity, this may still mean that energy travels across borders. 214
One possible solution could be to establish a mechanism to account for
renewable generation in the state the power is produced and establish new
distribution and transmission infrastructure which ensures use in the state in
which the public trust land is held. However, with the current interconnected
grid system, these solutions would likely be impractical or economically
unfeasible, and would seriously undermine the benefits of large-scale
offshore wind projects by limiting the magnitude of energy production.
However, this issue of cross-border transmission does not necessarily
spell disaster for offshore wind projects, especially due to the inability to
truly know where the generated energy is being used, and thus whether this
public trust principle of use by a particular state’s citizens will be violated in
any particular case. Even if a court adopts the most restrictive version of this
doctrine—that public trust resources may only benefit citizens of that state
alone—developers have a strong potential argument that wind projects
should pass muster. This proffered argument is based on the notion that just
as energy may be leaving the state because of how the grid works, there is an
equally likely chance that energy generated from similar renewable energy
developments elsewhere is coming into the state. By the very nature of a
regional approach to offshore wind development and the grid
interconnectivity, there will likely be reciprocity between states.
This notion of reciprocity is the key to understanding how developers
can overcome this particular hurdle. Indeed, elsewhere in the law, such as
within U.S. domestic takings law, arguments about reciprocity also serve to
overcome similar public interest limitations. In takings law, there is a general
rule that a regulation that goes “too far” will be recognized as a taking of a
Western Interconnection, Eastern Interconnection, and Texas Interconnection. U.S.
Electricity Grid & Markets, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (June 26,
2020), https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/us-electricity-grid-markets#:~:text=According%20
to%20the%20U.S.%20Energy,country%20(EIA%2C%202016).
212 Id.
213 Even estimates of energy use by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency categorize
energy profiles by region rather than by state. Power Profiler: How clean is the electricity you
use?, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.
epa.gov/egrid/power-profiler#/. There is no clear way to track energy from production to
consumption.
214 See About the U.S. Electricity System and its Impact on the Environment, UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/energy/
about-us-electricity-system-and-its-impact-environment (explaining the transmission grid).
211
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property right, and therefore must meet the constitutional requirements that
it be done for a public purpose and that the government fairly compensate
the holder. 215 In making such a determination of whether a regulation goes
“too far,” courts will compare the benefits of a regulation with the burden on
the individual property owner. 216 One of the benefits of a regulation to
Property Owner A, for example, might cause a burden on a neighboring
Property Owner B. This is the concept of “Average Reciprocity of
Advantage.” 217 In other words, a regulation does not amount to a taking so
long as it is applied over a broad cross-section of land on the theory that,
while the regulation does burden the property owner by shrinking their rights,
that same individual will benefit from the regulation’s impact on others in
the area. 218 So “while zoning at times reduces individual property values, the
burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the
whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be
benefited by another.” 219 In Plymouth Coal, the seminal decision concerning
average reciprocity of advantage, the court found that a regulation on coal
mining requiring mining companies to leave a support strip of coal was not a
taking. 220 While the regulation certainly took away property rights to mine
all the coal in that support strip, the safety benefits, which were provided to
the coal miners from this regulation on all coal mining operations in the area,
brought a sufficient average reciprocity of advantage as to not amount to an
unconstitutional taking. 221
While not perfectly analogous to the public trust doctrine, this concept
may be looked to by courts to deal with the uncertainties regarding the public
trust concerns noted above. The law has recognized the reciprocity of certain
actions in determining whether there has been a violation of an individual’s
rights. Just as an individual might reap the benefits and face the burden of a
regulation or zoning ordinance, the Great Lakes states might produce energy
on public trust land that goes to another state and might equally receive
energy through the grid that was produced on another state’s public trust
lands. This sort of average reciprocity offsets concerns that public trust
resources of one state are being used to benefit non-state residents in
violation of the public trust doctrine. Such reciprocity is inherent in the
regional approach to offshore wind development, which can be set forth in
the agreements. Thus, one can reasonably conclude that, on the whole, the
burden and benefits are shared evenly by the Great Lakes states, and
E.g., Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978).
217 Penn Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415 (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
531 (1914)).
218 K & K Const., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’tl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 384 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005).
219 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914).
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therefore, there is no violation of the public trust doctrine for reason of the
energy being consumed outside of the state it was produced in.
CONCLUSION
The Great Lakes hold a remarkable potential for distributed renewable
energy generation through offshore wind farms. Yet the existing domestic
legal regime in the United States has served as a barrier to the proliferation
of such wind energy developments. The waters of the Great Lakes and the
corresponding submerged lands are subject to the public trust doctrine, which
has confounded legal scholars and courts for decades. Generally, the doctrine
prohibits states from conveying public trust property for private
development, as the land is held in trust for the public’s use and enjoyment.
Questions arise as to the grounding of the doctrine and the role states play in
setting public trust principles. Conflicting decisions both within states and
between states further blur any principles set forth in the doctrine, which
inherently breeds uncertainty and risk for developers. The mere threat of
litigation and the inability to have any semblance of certainty with regards to
the outcome of a public trust claim inhibits the ability for wind developers to
begin, much less complete, projects.
Notwithstanding this confusion, there have been two fairly consistent
exceptions minimizing findings of public trust violations in the doctrine’s
jurisprudence. Courts have found that a conveyance of property rights to
private interests are not in violation of the doctrine if (1) the state remains
able to control the land or keeps title to the land; and/or (2) the project is
indisputably in the public benefit or does not impair the public interest.
Considering these exceptions, this note proposes that an international
treaty with a subsequent interstate compact between the Great Lakes states
might allow offshore wind development in the Great Lakes to overcome
public trust doctrine scrutiny. These agreements should be structured in a
way to emphasize the public benefits of offshore wind and establish a
framework for conveyance and regulatory control, which maximize the
changes of satisfying the exceptions set forth in the doctrine. Doing so will
provide additional certainty to project developers that offshore wind projects
in the Great Lakes will not be prohibited by public trust doctrine concerns.
While there may be a secondary concern because the energy grid may
transport energy outside of the state of generation, developers have a strong
argument to import other legal principles, such as average reciprocity of
advantage, to overcome this uncertainty and avoid violation of the public
trust doctrine. These agreements and the proposed framework have the
potential to aid the Great Lakes in realizing their vast potential in offshore
wind energy generation, greatly aiding the nation in meeting its renewable
energy goals and energy needs and reaping the vast additional benefits of
distributed renewable energy generation.
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